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Abstract—Cooperative networking brings performance improvement to most of the 
issues in wireless networks, such as fading or delay due to slow stations. However, due to 
cooperation when data is relayed via other nodes, there network is more prone to attacks. 
Since, channel access is very important for cooperation, most of the attacks happens at MAC.  
One of the most critical attack is denial of service, which is reason of cooperation failure. 
Therefore, the cooperative network as well as simple wireless LAN must be defensive against 
DOS attacks.  
In this article we analyzed all possible of DoS attacks that can happen at MAC layer of 
WLAN. The cooperative protocols must consider defense against these attacks.  This article 
also provided survey of available solutions to these attacks. At the end it described its 
damages and cost as well as how to handle these attacks while devising cooperative MAC.   
1. Introduction 
In Cooperative Networks the data is relayed via helper nodes. Instead of sending 
data directly to destination, it is sent to relay where the relay can forward it on behalf 
to source to the destination.  Let’s consider if the relay is non processive or move 
away in meanwhile. The data is lost simply. Therefore, the cost of cooperation is DoS 
attack. If we prevent our MAC from DoS, we can get the benefits of cooperation.  
DoS are such type of attack on a network that's aim is to exhaustedly usage of the 
network or system resources, which hold down forcedly the usage of network or 
system resources for the legitimate users. As shown in fig 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 DoS Attack 
 
A Denial-of-Service attack DoS is such kind of attack which targeting the accessibility of 
network system resources for other legitimate users [1]. In other kinds of attacks, the 
information is stolen or changes the data but DoS attack aim is slow down or takes down 
system resources for other users. The attackers' goals are diverse; he does that for simple fun 
or financial gain and ideology. The first step in denial of service (DoS) attack is generating 
high rate malicious traffic [2]; direct that malicious traffic flow towards victim network or 
resources' and consuming computing resources of target exhaustively. Therefore legitimate 
users are not able to access the system resources [3]. 
DoS attacks influence all organizations of the world. They can target all 7 layers of OSI 
model from physical layer a to the application layer. The difficult part of DoS attack is 
detection because traffic type seems legitimate traffic to the system resources [4].  
There are two types of DoS attacks. A (non-distributed) DoS attack and distributed DoS 
attack. In non-distributed DoS attack, an attacker uses a single machine's to overwhelm 
another machine. If target machine powerful then this type of attack doesn't affect target 
system. While in distributed DoS case, the attacker originates from multiple computers 
simultaneously, focus on single or multiple machines, therefore, causing the victim's 
resources exhaustion [5].  
2. How does an attack work? 
1) The first attacker chose to find the goals and system for the attack. Then he discovers 
the target network and calculated all the limitations of network and system resources.  
2) After first phase an attacker floods company’s network or system with useless and 
malicious information [6]. 
3) Since Network and system can only handle a limited amount of traffic and an 
attacker overloads the targeted system with the unlimited amount of traffic. 
4) Denial-of-service attacks disable the computer or the network partially or completely 
depending on the nature of the enterprise [7].  
For example in authentication flood, the users send an authentication request to AP, AP 
respond with approval if there is space for approving. If the user has malicious intention then 
he can flood the AP by sending the flood of authentication request which causes AP to 
respond and hence others nodes of the network face DoS [8]. 
3. Attack Types 
1. Packet Internet or Inter-Network Groper (Ping) Flood Attack or (ICMP echo) 
2. (synchronization)SYN Flood Attack (DoS attack) 
3. DDoS Attack (Distributed SYN Flood) 
4. Land Attack (Local Area Network Denial) 
5. Authentication request flood 
6. Association request flood 
7. CTS Flood attack 
8. RTS DoS Attack 
9. Beacon Flood 
3.1 Ping Flood Attack (ICMP echo) 
 
In Ping flood attack, the attacker focus is network bandwidth. An attempt by an 
attacker on a network focus is bandwidth, fill a network with ICMP echo request 
packets in order to slow or stop legitimate traffic going through the network. As 
shown in fig 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ping is a basic network program, which used for checking that system is alive to receive 
data or not. When a system receives the Ping message, the system must reply if it alive and 
active. Ping flood is also known as ICMP flood, To create DoS in the network, the attacker 
sends thousands of ping messages to victim node and victim node just only busy with 
responding that he is alive. At that time victim system are not able to process the other nodes 
information. Victim system is even not able to receive other data in worst case scenario. [10] 
3.2 SYN Flood Attack 
SYN messages are exchanges when a client needs to connect to a server in TCP.  The 
user sends an SYN message, in response server send back SYN-ACK message [11]. In SYN 
flood attacker sends so many SYN requests that the system is notable for other nodes to 
Figure 2Ping Flood Attack 
respond. Since the server is busy with the reply to malicious SYN message and legitimate 
users are in the waiting stage. As explained in fig 3. [9] 
 
 
Figure 3 SYN Flood Attack 
3.3 DDoS Attack 
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) is such kind of DOS attack there are many step 
stone systems are used for generating malicious traffic and after that directed the flow of 
malicious traffic to the victim system and that cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. As 
shown in fig 4 
 
Figure 4 DDoS Attack Flow of traffic 
 
 3.3.1 How DDoS Attacks Work 
There are three steps to launch the DDoS attack [12]. The main goal of the attacker is 
launching a large traffic and makes that flow direction towards victim system. For that, he 
first compromised many other systems called zombies. They are compromised using Trojans, 
infected system with malicious software and getting control of that zombie system. Using 
zombies having many advantages for the attacker, it's become impossible to block all 
zombies IPs addresses after detection. Each zombie generated traffic and direct that flow 
towards the victim. Even zombies detected attacker ID can't be detected.  [13] 
To handle zombies there is a controller in the second step.  This may be also a 
compromised system or a system used by attacker temporarily.  Controller, take instruction 
from an attacker, like how many zombies would be involved and for how much time, also 
malicious traffic format.  Even victim find the controller, attackers ID are still hidden from 
the victim. The zombies and controller are used as step stone in the above two phases. The 
third step is traffic directed towards the victim [14]. 
3.3.2 Types of DDoS Attacks 
 There are many types of DDoS attacks. Common attacks include the following: 
• Traffic attacks: In traffic attacks, the DDoS traffic is legitimate traffic like TCP, 
UDP, and ICMP. It's impossible for the victim to distinguish among malicious traffic 
and legitimate traffic because traffic pattern is same as like legitimate traffic.  That’s 
preventing legitimate user to access the system or network [15].  
• Bandwidth attacks: In that kind of attack attacker's aim is bandwidth only. So he 
fills the bandwidth with junk data. Traffic can be easily distinguished by victims but 
the amount of traffic is so much that it can't be handling [16].  
• Application attacks: In application attack, the attacker exploited the application layer 
and resource unavailable for legitimate users after malicious traffic. Application 
layers distributed data to system resources.  
3.3.3 Land Attack (Local Area Network Denial) 
• It’s an old kind of attack. In land attack, the attackers send malicious packets such that 
it has the same source and destination address.  Both host and source addresses are 
victim addresses.  It's mostly used in local area networks. The victim system is lock 
up after getting that packets and response to itself and loop continue until system 
detected or shutdown. As shown in fig 5. 
 
Figure 5 Land Attack (Local Area Network Denial) 
3.3.4 Authentication request flood 
• A node after listening bacon sends authentication request to AP, to associate itself 
with AP.  
• AP maintains a state table, where there is the list of authenticated nodes.   
• There are two kinds of effects of such DoS attack, First AP affected, because commit 
its normal operation and serve the request, when the request is too much, AP only will 
do the job maintaining the state table.  The second effects are legitimate users when 
state table is filled by malicious requests, there would be no space for accepting more 
legitimate requests.  State table also has limitations.  Shown in fig 6. 
• In that kind of attack attacker first, need to spoof the MAC of others node. So it's little 
difficult to launch if there is the proper mechanism of protection for MAC addresses. 
[17] 
 Figure 6 Authentication request flood 
3.3.5 Association request flood 
• After authentication, there is association step, in association step AP associate a client 
and make the entry in the association table. But this association is also vulnerable to 
DoS.  There is de-authentication packet after authentication from AP if that de-
authentication packet is spoofed and an attacker crack passwords then he can also 
reach to the association table. As shown in fig 7. 
• That table also has limits and if requests are beyond the limit of an associated table, 
there would defiantly a DoS attack.  
• It's harder to launch, because of the authentication step. An attacker must cross the 
authentication step [18]. 
•  
Figure 7 Association request flood 
•  
3.3.6 CTS Flood attack 
• IEEE 802.11 set standard for wireless networks. As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, first there is RTS, followed by CTS, then DATA and ACK frame. 
• Other nodes after listening CTS just update NAV and stay in quite a mood and start 
sensing media after CTS maintained time duration.   
• This behavior can be exploited by an attacker, if an attacker sends CTS to others after 
the interval to others node, other nodes would be in quite a state after receiving.    
•  If the sending malicious CTS are back to back, no other node is able to send data. As 
shown in fig 8.  
• There is also possible that CTS sender node increase the duration and nodes goes in 
the quiet state for the extra time.[17] 
 
3.3.7 RTS DoS Attack 
• RTS frame includes Frame Control, Duration, RA, TA, and FCS. By sending RTS 
frames mentioning large transmission duration, an attacker reserves the wireless 
medium for the overdue time and forces others wireless stations sharing the RF 
medium to delay their transmissions. As shown in fig 9.[18] 
 
Figure 8CTS Flood attack 
 
 Figure 9 RTS Flood 
 
3.3.8 Beacon Flood 
Wireless clients can detect the presence of access points by listening for the beacon 
frames transmitted from APs.  Beacon flood is launched by an attacker in such way, that first 
he generates thousands of malicious beacons around legitimate [20] AP that made difficult 
for the individual station to find the legitimate AP for the association. As shown in fig 10. 
 
Figure 10 Beacon Flood 
4. Damage & Costs 
1. Other affecting: There are many costs associated with denial-of-service attacks. Like 
an attacker target the server, when server down, it does not only effect the server but 
also other users and sites associated with that victim server [19]. 
2. Bandwidth wastage: Network resources are shared among many stations. Like 
bandwidth. If attacker launches DDoS attack it does not only affect the target because 
of wastage of bandwidth and that also slow down the activity of non-victim systems 
[21].   
3. Extra network channels: To detect the attack users must use extra resources only to 
handle and prevent their system from such kind of attacks. Like emailing, making 
logs etc. 
4. Insurance& Bandwidth cost: As in international market we pay per byte. In DoS 
attack case the traffic is very high from normal traffic and that also increases the 
bandwidth cost.   
5. How to handle DoS 
• Protecting: The first step should be protected in such kind of attack, protection 
mechanism should be installed by ISP, and there should be an agreement between 
ISP, an insurance policy. Most of the people do that after learning a lesson.   
• Detecting: If you detect properly then you would be able to respond accurately. For 
detection, there should be proper check and balance on log system, traffic pattern, 
updated blacklist and all updated detection software.  The attacker use different 
mechanism to launch the attack. So maybe detection not helps out in some kind of 
attacks [22].   
• Reacting: Reaction step comes when there is no proper protection and detection 
mechanism.  In that step there would some technical steps which are mostly 
implemented, are informing ISP,  start backup system and moving data to the backup 
system, decreasing the incoming traffic, applying available data content filters on 
incoming traffic, redirecting traffic, shut downing after data is moved.     [23] 
6. Available Solutions 
• The DoS attacks at the MAC layer discussed here are very common in the IEEE 
802.11 standard networks. 
• The attacker exploited mostly the non-implementation of the authentication method 
for management and control frames.  
• Mostly available solutions are cryptographically protecting of management and 
control frames. In that method first step is finding the vulnerability on the basis of 
cryptography and then the possible solution to mitigate these attacks.   
• IEEE made an amendment to the original standard IEEE 802.11 and releases a new 
standard 802.11w.It included the security features for management frames like data 
confidentiality, data origin authenticity, and replay protection [27]. 
• But for control frames, there are still no cryptographic protection schemes at the 
MAC layer. So control frames are still vulnerable to DoS attack. An attacker can 
easily exploit the control frame by spoofing them and then use for resource 
exhaustion.   
• The de-authentication vulnerability, in particular, can be fixed by authenticating 
control frames explicitly [26]. 
• De-authentication flooding, in particular, can be mitigated by delaying the effect of 
requests.   
• In RTS DoS attack, the network performance can be restored back by Reevaluate 
RTS Duration (RRD) technique [25].   
• MAC address spoofing can be protected if there is incrimination mechanism 
implanted in firmware in each node. When a node sends its MAC address there 
would incrimination after next frame by sender node.  Since firmware functionality 
of wireless card can't be changed by an attacker. The receiver will only accept and 
response such frames which have incremented MAC [24].   
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